On November 17 and 18, 2024, in Swedish territorial waters in the Baltic Sea, a Chinese bulk carrier, Yi Peng 3, was suspected of deliberately dragging anchor to cut sections of two undersea telecoms cables, connecting Lithuania and Sweden, and Finland and Germany respectively.
According to ship tracking data, the Chinese ship had passed above the two cables when they were severed.
On December 23, Sweden’s foreign minister said China had denied a request for prosecutors to conduct an investigation on the Chinese ship, despite Beijing pledging “cooperation” with the regional authorities.
Observers believed the incidents were an example of China’s gray zone tactics. Gray zone tactics — coercive actions that are shy of armed conflict but beyond normal diplomatic, economic, and other activities — are widely recognized as playing an increasingly important role in China’s efforts to advance its domestic, economic, foreign policy, and security objectives, according to RAND, a research organization.
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis stated on X on November 20 that it was “weird” that the incident had happened twice already. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said he believed the cables were deliberately sabotaged.
In October 2023, the anchor of a Chinese cargo ship, NewNew Polar Bear, cut a gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia, and a data cable that connects Estonia to Sweden.
Lin Jian, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, said China has consistently and fully fulfilled its obligations as a flag state. He also said China requires all Chinese vessels to strictly abide by the relevant laws and regulations.
European officials have also said they suspect the sabotage was linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, the Kremlin has denied the allegation.
Su Tzu-yun, director, Division of Defense Strategy and Resources, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan (INDSR), said it is reasonable to suspect Russia and the Chinese Communist Party.
Shen Ming-Shih, director, Division of National Security Research, INDSR, said Chinese vessels damaged undersea cables linking Taiwan’s main island and its archipelago, the Matsu Islands, in February 2023. He added that the incident in the Baltic Sea could be a Sino-Russian collusion.
Shen said this incident was taken from the same playbook in which China was indirectly helping Russia in its invasion of Ukraine, and to have a civilian ship carried out the sabotage of cables and pipeline, so as to have plausible deniability.
Shen said the possible goals of sabotaging undersea cables around Europe include hindering communications (especially in NATO countries that support Ukraine), testing European countries’ reactions to gray zone tactics, and undermining cooperation among European countries regarding the fields of communications and defense.
Jakub Janda, director, European Values Centre for Security Policy, and James Corera, director, Cyber, Technology and Security Program, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, in a commentary at The Strategist, said it is a timely reminder to Indo-Pacific countries to think about how their region is similarly vulnerable to subsea sabotage.
They said China’s refusal to cooperate fully with investigations erodes trust and transparency, especially in incidents involving shared resources, such as undersea cables, which serve as critical infrastructure for multiple nations. Disruption of undersea cables also poses significant risks to economic stability.
Janda and Corera said that China, in ignoring responsibility to assist in uncovering the truth and ensuring accountability, raises concerns about its commitment to preserve the stability of global infrastructure, and undermines cooperative norms that underpin a global rules-based order.
Photo credit: iStock/ MarianVejcik
