Collisions at sea and the collision regulations

Why do collisions happen?

There are many factors that contribute to events that result in ship collisions. Some of these are set out below.

Haste to arrive at a port in daylight or on a certain tide. Reluctance to “lose face” when doubt is creeping in. Reluctance of a watch-officer to disturb his captain who may be snatching a tiny rest after many hours on the bridge. Steaming too close inshore to give passengers a good look at some exotic island. Mistaking one navigational mark for another. A failure in understanding between a captain and his navigational officer or pilot. Excessive economy mindedness causing a captain to cut corners. British or American charts used by someone not thoroughly conversant with the language – or for that matter say a Japanese chart used by a European.

Violent weather can drive a vessel to collide even when it is securely anchored. A survey vessel must necessarily enter dangerous waters to work and must occasionally pay the price for so doing. Lack of training in modern navigational aids – especially in some “flag of convenience” ships. Relying on audible fog signals, which are notoriously unsuitable for trying to estimate a range and bearing. Navigating by eye and memory in clear weather – and then unexpected fog blots everything out. Failure of ships generators, steering gear and main engines. Failure to keep proper navigational watch. Failure to appreciate and to take appropriate action to avoid collision action under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs).

Although the very word collision implies contact and/or impact between vessels (it need not necessarily be between their respective hulls; contact with an anchor chain or with the fishing net of a trawler has been held to be contact within the meaning of the expression.

A vessel may cause damage by its negligence to another vessel without actual contact. A ship by proceeding at excessive speed can cause another ship to sink: The Royal Eagle, The Royal Sovereign, or to suffer chafing damage against a wharf simply by the swell or wash she creates.

A ship dragging her anchor was prima facie evidence of negligence.

An example of an attempt by one ship to impose liability on another for damage done to it through negligent navigation without there having been direct contact was the case of The Shell Spirit 2. In The Shell Spirit 2, the owners of the Greek vessel Patrai accused the tanker Shell Spirit 2 of being responsible for their vessel colliding with some moored barges by reason of her negligent navigation. The matter involved the use of sound signals. The Patrai’s owners, however, failed to prove their allegations.

The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (London, 20 October 1972; TS 77 (1977); Cmnd 6962) as amended on 19 November 1981 is commonly referred to as the Collision Regulations made pursuant to the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act 1894, s 418 applied. Section 11 of the Merchant Shipping (Amendment) Act 1966 (Act 15 of 1966), substituted the application of the collision regulations made under the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act 1894.

The United Kingdom Collision Regulations (Ships and Seaplanes on the Water) and Signals of Distress (Ships) Order 1965 (Order in Council SI 1965 No 1525) gave statutory effect to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960 (which were approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1960). The 1965 Order was subsequently revoked by the Collisions Regulations and Distress Signals Order, 1977 (SI 1977 No 982, as amended by SI 1977 No 1301), enacted under ss 418, 424 and 728 of the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act, 1894. The 1977 Order came into operation on July 15, 1977, giving statutory effect to COLREGs.

The 1972 Convention was designed to update and replace the Collision Regulations of 1960 which were adopted at the same time as the 1960 SOLAS Convention. An important change in the 1972 COLREG was the recognition given to traffic separation schemes – Rule 10 gives guidance in determining safe speed, the risk of collision and the conduct of vessels operating in or near traffic separation schemes.

The purpose of the Collision Regulations is to minimize the results of collision. The rules should not be rigidly applied and departure may be justified if necessary to avoid immediate danger of collision.

Damage by collision is damage sustained by a ship as a result of another ship coming into contact with her. Damage done by a ship to a pier or other structure on land is not damage by collision for this purpose.

The COLREGs include 41 rules divided into six sections:

Part A – General;
Part B – Steering and Sailing;
Part C – Lights and Shapes;
Part D – Sound and Light signals;
Part E – Exemptions; and
Part F – Verification of compliance with the provisions of the Convention.

There are also four annexes containing:

technical requirements concerning lights and shapes and their positioning;
sound signaling appliances;
additional signals for fishing vessels when operating in close proximity; and
international distress signals.

Apportionment of liability

In collision cases, the court arrives at the apportionment of liability or degrees of fault proved by evidence judicially arrived at and sufficiently made out.

The degree of fault of the colliding vessels is not always easy to ascertain. In The Linde, Brandon J commented on the process:

“… the authorities show that unless a clear preponderance of blame on one side or the other exists liability should be divided equally. In the present case both ships were guilty of the same three serious faults of navigation (there were bad radar look out and appreciation; excessive speed; altering course at an improper time). In respect of one of these three faults there is some material for saying that the faults of Linde was greater than the fault of the Aristos. But looking at the case as a whole, I do not consider that this difference amounts to a clear preponderance of blame. An apportionment of 60-40 in favor of the plaintiffs (owners of the Aristos) would involve a judgment that the Linde was half as much to blame as the Aristos. I do not consider, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that such a judgment would fairly reflect the relative blameworthiness of the two ships. In my judgment there is no clear preponderance of blame on the Linde and it follows that liability should be divided equally, and so I hold.”

Where the court finds it impossible to arrive at a clear apportionment of liability, it may invoke section 1 of the United Kingdom Maritime Conventions Act 1911. The provisions of the United Kingdom Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo 5 c 7) are incorporated in the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 (FM Ord No 70 of 1952) s 513.

Before the section can be invoked, the court must apportion liability in proportion to the degree, in which each vessel was at fault, unless it was impossible to do so. In The Anneliese, Davies LJ described the operation of section 1 of the United Kingdom Maritime Conventions Act 1911:

” … section 1 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 should be interpreted to mean not that the liability shall be apportioned equally unless different degrees of fault are shown, but conversely, the Court must apportion the liability in proportion to the degree in which each vessel was at fault unless it is impossible to do so.”

The Bywell Castle Rule excuses the action of the vessel suddenly confronted with a collision situation when the evading actions turn out to be wrong in the agony of the moment.

In the case of The Bywell Castle, it was held that the actions taken by the Bywell Castle to avoid a collision with the Princess Alice approaching in the opposite direction when the Princess Alice when close to the Bywell Castle suddenly and negligently hard a ported the wheel. The master of the Bywell Castle equally hastily but wrongly put her wheel hard a starboard and collided into the Princess Alice causing both vessels to sink. The court held that the Bywell Castle was not to blame even though the actions taken was the wrong action.

The party that embarks on a deliberate act of negligence should bear the greater degree of fault, but the other party should bear fault based on their failure to cope adequately with the resulting crisis.

The claim for collision damage must be proved through the chain of causation. In The Zaglebie Dabrowskie Brandon J. stated:

” … When a ship is badly holed as a result of a collision and sinks some three hours later due to water entering through the hole so made, there arises a prima facie case that the ship was lost as a result of the collision. It is then open to the defendants (the other ship) to try and rebut such prima facie case by showing that there was intervening negligence of those on board the plaintiff’s (lost) ship which broke the chain of causation. The burden of proving such intervening negligence is on the defendants who allege it.”

COLREG Rules

Some of the rules are set out below.

Rule 1

Application

(a) These rules shall apply to all vessels upon the high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.

Responsibility

(a) Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.

(b) In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.

Rule 2 (a)

Rules of good seamanship. The rules of good seamanship extend over the whole range of conditions in the working of a vessel from the time of launching and getting underway until she returns to her anchorage in port or moorings in a dock: SS Heranger (owners) v SS Diamond (owners).

The question of what is good seamanship is one of fact to be decided on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances: SS Heranger (owners) v SS Diamond (owners).

Relationship between the rules of good seamanship and the collision regulations. hi any case where one of the rules contained in the Collision Regulations applies and the obligation imposed by that rule differs from the obligation, which, in the absence of such a rule, would be imposed by good seamanship, the rule must be observed. A difference may exist between the obligation contained in the Collision Regulations r 8(e) to slacken speed and take all way off if necessary to avoid collision and the practice of good seamanship to keep way on the ship to make her more manageable.

In general, however, the duty to observe good seamanship has been preserved by the Collision Regulations. Moreover, the rules of good seamanship normally embody the obligations to be observed by persons in charge of vessels in circumstances for which the Collision Regulations make no provision, or in other cases where those Regulations do not apply.

Rule 4

Application

Rules in this section apply in any condition of visibility.

Rule 5

Look-out

Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by an available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Rule 6 Safe Speed Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and condition.

A common reason for a collision at sea is failure to maintain a proper lookout.

In The Sabine, the vessel, Ore Prince, went aground in the River Schelde on her way to Antwerp. The Sabine had been obliged to anchor about six cables distance up river from the Ore Prince due to the failure of her steering gear.

Late in the evening just after high water when it was dark but the visibility was clear and while the Ore Prince was being assisted by 13 tugs to refloat, the Sabine was also being assisted by tugs (six in number) to turn in the river with a view to proceeding upstream and into Antwerp port.

The attention of those on each vessel was so concentrated on their own respective problems that each failed to observe what was happening so far as the other ship was concerned. The Ore Prince omitted to notice the Sabine swinging round until after she (the Ore Prince) had been refloated and was making headway up the river.

At that point of time the Sabine, herself around 650 feet in length, was lying across the river which had a width there of around 900 feet only. Instead of holding back until the Sabine had fully swung round, the Ore Prince, with her attendant tugs, tried to edge through the limited space between the Sabine’s stern and the river’s edge. She failed, and the two ships collided.

The Sabine could have checked her swing until the Ore Prince had passed but, incredibly, seemed to have been entirely oblivious of the movements and proximity of the Ore Prince and her 13 tugs. The Court found that both vessels were equally to blame, the proximate cause of the collision on both sides being failure to maintain a proper look-out.

Rule 6

Safe Speed

Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and condition.

In determining a safe speed, the following factors shall be among those taken into account:

(a) By all vessels:

the state of visibility;

the traffic density including concentrations of fishing vessels or any other vessels;

the maneuverability of the vessel with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability in the prevailing conditions;

at night the presence of background light such as from shore lights or from back scatter of her own lights;

the state of wind, sea and current, and the proximity of navigational hazards;

the draught in relation to the available depth of water.

(b) Additionally, by vessels with operational radar:

the characteristics, efficiency and limitations of the radar equipment;

any constraints imposed by the radar range scale in use;

the effect on radar detection of the sea state, weather and other sources of interference;

the possibility that small vessels, ice and other floating objects may not be detected by radar at an adequate range

In The Roseline, in May 1978 the Roseline collided with the Eleni V six miles off the coast of Norfolk (England). The Eleni V was split in two and spilled much of her cargo of oil into the sea. Fog was thick at the time. Both ships carried radar in working order. Each ship knew of the other’s presence at a distance of six miles. Three minutes before impact the Eleni V turned to port.

The Court found that both ships were at fault in not proceeding at safe speeds under the circumstances. The Eleni V’s turn to port was inexcusable and changed a dangerous “passing” situation into a “dramatically” dangerous crossing situation. This meant that the substantial fault was with the Eleni V (60 per cent). Roseline’s failure to react, however, was causative in part (40 per cent), particularly as it seems she was not making proper use of her radar at that crucial moment.

Rule 7

Risk of Collision

(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist.

(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.

(d) In determining if risk of collision exists the following consideration shall be among those taken into account:

such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreciably change;

such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large vessel or a tow or when approaching a vessel at close range.

In the Mancunium/Deepdale 2, the collision occurred in the South-Eastern channel in the River Mersey. The Mancunium was a hopper laden with sludge and was out-bound. The Deepdale was in-bound with a cargo of tallow. Both ships were in waters covered by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (the version prior to the 1983 version).

The stem of the Mancunium collided with the port side of the Deepdale about one-third of the way along her length. The Admiralty Judge found that the Mancunium was substantially to blame because of the failure of those responsible for her navigation to hold her in control in a flood tide. The skill required to do so was within their competence and they had failed to exercise it. The Mancunium had created a risk of collision by the unreasonable actions of those in charge of her.

The Deepdale, however, was initially an innocent party. She was maintaining her course at a reasonable speed on the correct side of the channel, but when she saw a risk of collision, she put her engines hard astern which rather than reduce the risk of collision in fact increased it. Her fault was, however, less of a contributory factor than the Mancunium so that blame was apportioned two-thirds to the Mancunium and one-third to the Deepdale.

Rule 8

Action to Avoid Collision

(a) Any action taken to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case, admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observance of good seamanship.

(b) Any alteration of course and/or speed to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be large enough to be readily apparent to another vessel observing visually or by radar; a succession of small alterations of course and / or speed should be avoided.

(c) If there is sufficient sea room, alteration of course alone may be the most effective action to avoid a close-quarters situation provided that it is made in good time, is substantial and does not result in another close-quarters situation.

(d) Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall be such as to result in passing at a safe distance. The effectiveness of the action shall be carefully checked until the other vessel is finally past and clear.

(e) If necessary to avoid collision or allow more time to assess the situation, a vessel shall slacken her speed or take all way off by stopping or reversing her means of propulsion.

(f) A vessel which, by any of these rules, is required not to impede the passage of safe passage of another vessel shall, when required by the circumstances of the case, take early action to allow sufficient sea room for the safe passage of the other vessel.

(g) A vessel which is required not to impede the passage or safe passage of another vessel is not relieved of this obligation if approaching the other vessel so as to involve risk of collision and shall, when taking action, have full regard to the action which may be required by the rules of this Part.

(h) A vessel the passage of which is not to be impeded remains fully obliged to comply with the rules of this Part when the two vessels are approaching one another so as to involve risk of collision.

In The Argo Hope/The Babington, a collision occurred in the Manchester Ship Canal, the port bow of the Babington striking the port bow of the Argo Hope at roughly a 30-degree angle. It was dark but the weather was fine and visibility good. There were local by-laws for navigating the Canal including a maximum permitted speed, but the rules for ships approaching each other from opposite directions were essentially the same as the international rules (i.e., rule 14).

The Court found that the Argo Hope caused the collision by altering to port but the Babington’s failure to judge correctly the speed and approach course of the Argo Hope and her failure to allow the Argo Hope as much room as possible by keeping well over to her starboard side contributed to the eventual impact. The Argo Hope bore the substantial blame (85 per cent) by wrongly altering to port and the Babington 15 per cent by not accordingly navigating with sufficient caution as expressly required by the Canal by-law.

Rule 9

Narrow Channels

(a) A vessel proceeding along the course of a narrow channel or fairway shall keep as near to the outer limit of the channel or fairway which lies on her starboard side as is safe and practicable.

(b) A vessel of less than 20 meters in length or a sailing vessel shall not impede the passage of a vessel which can safely navigate only within a narrow channel or fairway.

(c) A vessel engaged in fishing shall not impede the passage of any other vessel navigating within a narrow channel or fairway.

(d) A vessel shall not cross a narrow channel or fairway if such crossing impedes the passage of a vessel which can safely navigate only within such channel or fairway. The latter vessel may use the sound signal prescribed in Rule 34 (d) if in doubt as to the intention of the crossing vessel.

(e) (i) In a narrow channel or fairway when overtaking can take place only if the vessel to be overtaken has to take action to permit safe passing, the vessel intending to overtake shall indicate her intention by sounding the appropriate signal prescribed in Rule 34 (c) (i). The Vessel to be overtaken shall, if in agreement, sound the appropriate signal prescribed in Rule 34 (c) (ii) and take steps to permit safe passing. If in doubt she may sound the signals prescribed in Rule 34 (d).

(ii) This Rule does not relieve the overtaking vessel of her obligation under Rule 13.

(f) A vessel nearing a bend or an area of a narrow channel or fairway where other vessels may be obscured by an intervening obstruction shall navigate with particular alertness and caution and shall sound the appropriate signal prescribed in Rule 34 (e).

(g) Any vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid anchoring in a narrow channel.

Prima facie “narrow channel” means a channel bounded on either side by land, so that a vessel cannot navigate in any great width between the two banks; it is opposed to “at sea”; see The Florence Nightingale and The Maeander.

A narrow channel must have two boundaries which are close to one another; a stretch of water which on one side is open to an indefinite extent cannot be a narrow channel. The court will not lay down what particular width or length will constitute a narrow channel. Whether a space of water is a narrow channel may be entirely a question of fact.

The rule will apply in the absence of any local rule.

In the case of The Nordic Ferry, Sheen J. had explained the rationale in applying the rule:

“… He cannot excuse his conduct in navigating down the wrong side of the fairway. It was that navigation which created the situation of difficulty in which [the ship] found itself … a ship which, without excuse, navigates on the wrong side of the channel should, as a rule, find itself more harshly judged than the negligent navigator who fails to react promptly enough to the unexpected problem thereby created.”

Starboard Rule

In The Winstanley it was held that a vessel ought to round in so as to enter either on the right side of the channel marked by the buoys, or outside the right-hand buoy. In The Fatheon, the court held that the collision was caused by the failure of both vessels to keep to the outer limits of their fairway, which lay on their respective starboard sides, as was safe and practicable in accordance with Rule 9.

When such an entrance or opening is a narrow channel, the duty to keep to the starboard side applies in so much of the water inside and outside of the entrance as is required for maneuvering for the entrance. Even apart from the narrow channel rule, a vessel going out of or coming into a narrow harbor entrance ought not to cross the entrance so close as not to leave room for vessels going the other way, but ought to make a wide sweep so as to leave them a fairway .

Rule 10

Traffic Separation Schemes

(a) This rule applies to traffic separation schemes adopted by the Organization and does not relieve any vessel of her obligation under any other rule.

(b) A vessel using a traffic separation scheme shall:

proceed in the appropriate traffic lane in the general direction of traffic flow for that lane;

so far as practicable keep clear of a traffic separation line or separation zone;

normally join or leave a traffic lane at the termination of the lane, but when joining or leaving from either side shall do so at as small an angle to the general direction of traffic flow as practicable.

(c) A vessel shall so far as practicable avoid crossing traffic lanes, but if obliged to do so shall cross on a heading as nearly as practicable at right angles to the general direction of traffic flow.

The purpose of traffic separation schemes is to ensure that maritime traffic navigating in the area demarcated as the traffic separation scheme proceed in an orderly manner and in a manner, which minimizes the risk of any collision or any untoward incidents.

Regulation 8 of Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) of SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) provides that the International Maritime Organization is the only organization competent to deal with international measures concerning the routing of ships. The effectiveness of traffic separation schemes can be judged from a study made by the International Association of Institutes of Navigation (IAIN) in 1981.

According to the study, between 1956 and 1960, there were 60 collisions in the Straits of Dover; twenty years later with the introduction of traffic separation schemes, the number of collisions was reduced to 16. In other areas where such schemes did not exist the number of collisions rose sharply.

Vessels navigating through the Straits of Malacca are required to observe the rules set out in the Merchant Shipping (Collision Regulations) (Rules for Vessels Navigating through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore) Order 2000 (PU (A) 105/00).

In Nordic Clansman, her master was charged with contravention of s 4192) of the Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1894 and with that breaching r 10(d) by willfully using the wrong traffic lane to approach.

For a case involving a collision between two vessels within the Traffic Separation Scheme off Singapore see The Century Dawn and Asian Energy.

Section II Conduct of vessels in sight of one another

Rule 11 Application Rules in this Section apply to vessels in sight of one another.

Rule 13

Overtaking

(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules of Part B, Sections I and II of this Section any vessel overtaking any other shall keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken.

(b) A vessel shall be deemed to be overtaking when coming up with another vessel from a direction more than 22.5 degrees abaft her beam, that is, in such a position with reference to the vessel she is overtaking, that at night she would be able to see only the stemlight of that vessel but neither of her sidelights.

(c) When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether she is overtaking another, she shall assume that this is the case and act accordingly.

(d) Any subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two vessels shall not make the overtaking vessel a crossing vessel within the meaning of these Rules or relieve her of the duty of keeping clear of the overtaken vessel until she is finally past and clear.

Overtaking. A vessel is deemed to be “coming up” with another when there is some proximity in space between them even though there is no risk of collision at that time.

When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether she is overtaking another, she must assume that this is the case and act accordingly; see r 13(c).

Any subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two vessels does not make the overtaking vessel a crossing vessel or relieve her of the duty of keeping clear of the overtaken vessel until she is formally past and clear; see r 13(d).

Overtaking or crossing

One difficulty is distinguishing between a crossing and an overtaking situation, as a vessel crossing from the starboard side would have right of way, but not if she was overtaking. The position is that the overtaking can apply even before there is a risk of collision (i.e., by the courses intersecting. A ship is overtaking whenever she is coming up on another vessel from a position more than 22.5 degrees abaft her beam (i.e., so that at night the stern light could be seen, but not the sidelights): see r 13(b). Once the overtaking rule applies, the overtaking ship cannot make herself a crossing vessel by altering course.

When a vessel is in any doubt as to whether she is overtaking another, she must assume that this is the case and act accordingly.

In The Iran Torab, a collision occurred between the vessels Tan and Iran Torab in the Khor Musa Bar Channel whilst proceeding in convoy due to the Gulf War in 1984. The Iran Torab took steps to overtake ships in the line on their starboard side but a collision occurred with the vessel Tan.

The Court found that when the Iran Torab commenced to pass Tan, she did so at a safe passing distance of about half a cable. As soon as the overtaking maneuver commenced there was a close quarters situation in which it was the duty of Iran Torab to keep out of the way of Tan. The Master of the Iran Torab should have appreciated that the vessels were much closer than he thought and should have altered his course to starboard.

The main cause of the collision was that the Iran Torab failed to keep out of the way of Tan and this was because Iran Torab steered a converging course and failed to keep a lookout by watching a ship which was being passed very close on her portside. If a continuous and effective lookout could not be maintained, the Master of the Iran Torab ought not to have set a course to port of an up-channel course until he was safely past and clear. The vessel Tan, being the overtaken ship, should have altered course sufficiently early to avoid the possibility of being drawn towards Iran Torab and the collision was caused partly by the fault of Tan.

The Master of the Iran Torab took a decision to overtake Tan and his manoeuvres had to be judged on the basis that they were highly blameworthy and potently causative of the collision. The Master of the Tan failed to react correctly to the dangerous situation thrust upon her in that no effective lookout had been maintained. The Iran Torab was 80 per cent to blame and the Tan was 20 per cent to blame.

Rule 15

Crossing Situation

When two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.

Where vessels are crossing in such a position that the range lights are distinctly open and one sidelight clearly visible, there should be no room for misinterpretation of the Rules and thence no confusion and there should be no collision, yet this is one of the most common types of collision. The causes are several but probably the predominant one is the higher speed of approach; the greater the relative speed of closing, the less time for correct assessment of the hazard and the more likelihood of mistake.

In The Toni, the Court found that officer of the watch on board one of the ships seemed not to understand what a crossing situation under the Collision Regulations was or what ships in such a situation was supposed to do. On the facts both ships were found to be equally blameworthy and causative and apportioned the liability equally

Rule 14

Head On

When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or nearly reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision each shall alter her course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other: r. 14

Rule 15

Crossing

Rule 18

Responsibilities between Vessels

Except where Rules 9, 10 and 13 otherwise require:

(a) A power-driven vessel underway shall keep out of the way of

a vessel not under command;

a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver;

a vessel engaged in fishing; (iv) a sailing vessel.

(b) A sailing vessel underway shall keep out of the way of

a vessel not under command;

a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver;

a vessel engaged in fishing.

(i) a vessel not under command;

(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver.

(d) (i) Any vessel other than a vessel not under command or a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid impeding the safe passage of a vessel constrained by her draught, exhibiting the signals in Rule 28.

(ii) A vessel constrained by her draught shall navigate with particular caution having full regard to her special condition.

(e) A seaplane on the water shall, in general, keep well clear of all vessels and avoid impeding their navigation. In circumstances, however, where risk of collision exists, she shall comply with the Rules of this Part.

(f) A WIG craft shall—

when taking off, landing and in flight near the surface, keep well clear of all other vessels to avoid impeding their navigation; and

when operating on the water surface, comply with the rules of this Part as a power-driven vessel or these purposes, “sailing vessel” means any vessel under sail provided that propelling machinery if fitted is not being used see r 3(c).

A power-driven vessel may perform her duty of keeping out of the way of a sailing vessel by decreasing her speed or by altering her course so as to pass astern; but course to a sailing vessel approaching from a distance at night if she cannot see her lights owing to their improper position or otherwise and is in doubt as to the course the sailing vessel is pursuing and on which side she is going to pass; a prudent master of a power-driven vessel, if in doubt as to the course of the sailing vessel and if it is necessary to act, ought to wait by slackening speed or stopping until he can ascertain her course.

Photo credit: iStock/ Photos by Painter. A generic image of a sinking vessel.