The Malaysian government is boosting military protection for East Malaysia by constructing a new naval base in Bintulu, Sarawak, amid rising animosities with China in the South China Sea and spiraling pressure from China in the resource-rich area near Kalimantan.
On September 4, 2024, the Malay Mail reported Sarawak minister Datuk Seri Abdul Karim Rahman Hamzah as saying that the Royal Malaysian Navy (TLDM) must set up a base in Bintulu due to the town’s strategic location.
“The proposal for a TLDM base to be built there is still in the planning stages. However, given that Bintulu is a key hub for our resource export activities and an industrial center in central Sarawak, it requires adequate protection. Considering Bintulu’s strategic importance, it is essential to safeguard this area, especially since it holds significant gas and oil resources, as well as vital marine life,” Abdul Karim said.
Moreover, Abdul Karim stated that depending on TLDM to react to any possible invasion of Sarawak from Lumut or Sabah would be too slow.
“So, we feel it’s time the Malaysian government should speed up this matter,” he asserted.
Poised to be ready by 2030, the base is expected to enhance military protection for Sarawak and Sabah in light of recalcitrant incursions by China’s navy into Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off the coast of Sarawak, according to local media Free Malaysian Today (FMT).
Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a country holds exclusive rights to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in its EEZ, delineated as waters extending up to 200 nautical miles offshore.
Notably, the scheduled base in Bintulu will be strategically situated just 80 nautical miles from the South Luconia Shoals – known as Beting Patinggi Ali to Malaysia. Beijing asserted that this region belongs to China, despite the area falling within Malaysia’s 200 nautical-mile EEZ.
China has insisted on sovereignty over almost all of the South China Sea. In 2016, China rejected an international arbitration ruling which stated it has no legal basis for the expansive claims. China refuses to accept this 2016 UNCLOS ruling, of which it is a State Party to UNCLOS, and dismissed the ruling as “nothing more than a piece of waste paper”.
However, analysts have opined that Malaysia will remain discreet to prevent intensifying hostilities with China, owing to the emphasis on good economic ties with Beijing.
For example, analysts interviewed by Channel News Asia declared that while the proposed naval base lies near contested waters in the South China Sea, the Malaysian government does not view the base as jeopardizing China – Malaysia ties “as long as it continues to keep a non-megaphone approach to the dispute”.
“The naval base and potentially increased Malaysian maritime presence in the area may come across as a nuisance to Beijing, but that’s just it,” Dr Collin Koh, a senior fellow at Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies was cited by CNA as saying.
“End of the day, it’s the political demeanor in Kuala Lumpur, not what’s happening on the ground with Malaysia’s naval buildup in Borneo, that seems to be the key determinant in overall relationship with Beijing.”
The proposed new Region 4 Naval Headquarters in Bintulu will be Malaysia’s sixth main naval base. Currently, the country has three bases in West Malaysia, with another two in Sabah.
Beijing’s claim to the South China Sea, represented by the nine-dash line/10-dash line, has ignited territorial disputes with neighboring countries. For instance, Beting Patinggi Ali, one of the areas claimed by China, has become a hotspot in regional geopolitical dynamics.
The constant presence of Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels in Malaysia’s EEZ revealed Beijing’s attempts to stake sovereignty claims and control natural resources in the area, to the chagrin of the Malaysian authorities.
According to a recent report by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), CCG vessels have become prevalent in Malaysia’s EEZ in 2024. AMTI data revealed that from the beginning of 2024 to the end of September, at least one CCG vessel patrolled the area almost every day. Furthermore, these vessels remained in the region for up to six weeks before another vessel took over the patrolling tasks.
Under former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad in the 1990s, Kuala Lumpur embraced a three-pronged approach towards its rival claims with Beijing in the South China Sea.
While hoping to firmly articulate its territorial claims inside its EEZ and deploy military personnel to the five atolls in the disputed Spratly Islands, Malaysia has attempted to separate its disputes from the country’s important economic ties with China.
Besides, Malaysia has tried to promote the ASEAN-China conflict management process and develop a Code of Conduct (CoC) to solve territorial disputes with China via talks.
However, since 2019, Malaysia has publicly dismissed China’s nine-dash line claim, calling it “ridiculous”.
China’s South China Sea claims have also clashed with those of Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam. In recent months, there were numerous confrontations between China and the Philippines, primarily at the Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. Notably, Chinese ships were using water cannons against Filipino boats. On September 29, a Chinese ship was reported to have entered Vietnamese waters and attacked a local fishing boat, injuring 10 people.
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