China is using a series of gray zone tactics against the Philippines in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, which are designed to operate below the threshold of triggering a conventional warfare. With gray zone tactics as an extension of national power and to shape regional dynamics in favor of Beijing, China is also wary of drawing the U.S., a Filipino ally, into the conflict.
On January 12, the China Coast Guard (CCG) drove a Filipino fishing boat captain and crew away from disputed Scarborough Shoal, forcing the Filipinos to dump their catch, despite a ruling by an international tribunal at The Hague in 2016 that stated China’s overarching claims on the contested waterway lacked legal grounds.
In recent months, the CCG also regularly intimidated foreign-owned vessels in the contested waters of the South China Sea, such as shining lasers at Philippine ships and shooting water cannons at them. Additionally, the CCG and Chinese militia ships had blocked Filipino supply boats in the contested Second Thomas shoal, where there are military personnel on the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded warship which serves as an outpost.
On May 19, the Philippines accused the CCG of confiscating and dumping overboard food and other supplies meant for Filipino troops on the BRP Sierra Madre, and hampering a medical evacuation of ailing soldiers. Reportedly, the Chinese seized and dumped some of the provisions, mostly food, into the sea, they also took supplies for themselves.
Since 2013, China has been reclaiming and militarizing reefs and islands to stake a sovereign claim in almost the entire South China Sea, an area rich in fish stock, and oil and gas deposits.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding China’s gray zone activities, the Philippine resupply missions in 2023 and early 2024 were largely successful as Beijing did not attain its aim of preventing essential supplies from reaching the BRP Sierra Madre.
Additionally, according to a report published by East Asia Forum, the Philippines’ “new tactic of publicizing China’s assertive conduct in the South China Sea, beginning in February 2023”, has limited the effectiveness of China’s gray zone tactics as Manila’s strategy has arguably “bolstered public support for sovereignty protection measures” and increased international pressure on China.
The report stated: “In 2021, only 43 per cent of missions were disclosed compared to 80 per cent in 2023. Public opinion surveys in December 2023 showed 61 per cent support the Ferdinand Marcos Jr administration’s response to the South China Sea dispute, reflecting a sustained increase from previous quarters.”
The report added: “Beijing’s approach has deepened public skepticism in the Philippines toward China. According to a 2024 survey, if forced to align with either China or the United States, most Filipinos would align with the United States.”
The report cited Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s efforts to boost ties with the U.S. under the administration of Joe Biden and forge bilateral alliances with countries like Japan and Australia as means to frustrate Beijing’s gray zone tactics. Consequently, in the event of a Chinese attack on the Philippines, Beijing would have to deal with the deterring prospect of the “1951 U.S. – Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and the involvement of other regional powers, especially Australia and Japan” in its conflict with the Philippines.
Sealight, a maritime transparency effort originating from Stanford University, released a Chinese gray zone playbook that highlighted various Chinese actions that could be reciprocated by regional countries. Think tank Lowy Institute also suggested in an article that “just as Chinese Coast Guard ships use water cannons against fishing vessels and coast guard ships, nations subject to such actions could do the same” to reduce Chinese gray zone activities. The article also indicated that “large vessels might be leased and used to crowd out and block Chinese coast guard or armed militia vessels, just as China regularly does to smaller navies and commercial fishing boats.”
A commentary by Derek Grossman on Foreign Policy proposed that instead of “vaguely highlighting an ‘armed attack’ as the prompt for U.S. military intervention, Manila and Washington could broadly note that gray zone activities could or would count as armed attacks” to deter China.
“Imposing costs for aggressive actions would fit neatly into the Biden administration’s so-called integrated deterrence strategy,” Grossman suggested.
Evidently, China’s gray zone tactics would only be as effective as the Philippines’ (and its allies’) response to them. If nothing is done, Beijing would likely persist in its strategy of intimidating Manila. A firm and calculated response by Manila could at least limit the frequency and scope of Beijing’s military assertiveness.
Photo credit: iStock/ gorodenkoff
