Summary of “The Vessel, Equipment and Operating Arrangements”
Overview of Honeybourne III
Honeybourne III, a scallop dredger built in 1983 and converted in 1996, employed a quick-release chain system supported by two derricks. This design allowed for rapid gear release to prevent capsizing during emergencies, utilizing a complex assembly of chains and pins that had no defined load limits.
MAIB Investigation Findings
The UK’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) identified significant defects after examining the vessel’s equipment. Notably, the quick-release chain fractured due to a combination of high shock loads and bending stresses, which exceeded operational tolerances. Although the chain adhered to original specifications, it showed compromised ductility and wear that had not been addressed during routine inspections.
Failure Mechanism
The chain failure occurred in two stages: one section fractured under brittle conditions, while another deteriorated ductilely. Inspectors noted hardness levels above recommended limits, contributing to susceptibility to sudden fractures. Both metallurgical testing and finite element modeling confirmed the detrimental impact of bending stresses on chain integrity.
Wear and Tear Issues
Extreme wear appeared on several components, including the static pin and cheek plates, resulting in improper load alignment and accelerated damage. Despite recent replacements, inspections failed to recognize excessive wear conditions, with monthly evaluations inaccurately categorizing equipment as “satisfactory.”
Inspection and Maintenance Deficiencies
MAIB criticized the inspection protocols, highlighting a lack of clear criteria for acceptable wear and insufficient training of crew designated as inspectors. The reliance on untrained personnel led to overlooked faults and inadequate maintenance practices. Historical failures within the same fleet further emphasized systemic issues in equipment oversight.
Safety Management System Failings
The existing Safety Management System (SMS) exhibited serious flaws, notably the continued risk of crew working beneath suspended loads, contradicting lifting protocols. Additionally, non-compliant personal protective equipment (PPE) usage indicated inadequate enforcement of safety standards across the crew.
Regulatory Oversight Concerns
The MCA’s regulatory practices were deemed insufficient, especially in recognizing deficiencies during annual inspections. Post-accident evaluations highlighted severe wear that should have been identified in routine checks, indicating gaps in regulatory competence concerning lifting gear.
Conclusions from MAIB Report
The investigation identified seven key safety issues contributing to the accident, including:
- Inadequate awareness of risks with chain-over-pin arrangements.
- Excessive loading stresses on chain links.
- Insufficient inspections failing to address deteriorating gear.
- Ineffective application of safety management systems.
Wider issues, such as poor PPE management and inadequate training, were also noted.
Actions and Recommendations Post-Accident
In response, Macduff Shellfish has committed to overhauling their equipment across the fleet, enhancing inspection frequencies, prohibiting crew beneath suspended loads, and implementing formal training on equipment safety. The MCA initiated inspections focusing on scallop dredgers to address widespread safety deficiencies.
The MAIB issued Safety Bulletin 1/2024, urging proactive inspections of quick-release arrangements. The bulletins and recommendations aim to foster a safer working environment for crew members in the fishing industry, without assigning blame but focusing solely on accident prevention.
