Since Xi Jinping assumed leadership in 2012, a significant number of military and defense industry leaders in China have been removed from their posts. This includes over 15 senior officials and executives, along with critical figures within the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, indicating an intensified anti-corruption campaign. Xi has emphasized that corruption poses the greatest threat to the Communist Party, declaring at a recent plenary session that the party’s commitment to combating corruption will only deepen.
Rumors continue to circulate amid these purges, especially following the Pentagon’s December 2024 report on China’s military capabilities, which highlighted the detrimental effects of corruption on the PLA. Some analysts suggest that these leadership changes could hinder the effectiveness of the PLA Navy (PLAN). However, this perspective is challenged by research indicating that while corruption is a persistent issue, it does not deliver crippling blows to the military’s operational readiness or capabilities.
The ongoing investigations and purges have seen high-profile figures such as Admiral Miao Hua and Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng dismissed, raising questions about their impacts on naval leadership and operations. Li’s career, for example, was marked by noteworthy achievements, yet he was removed under mysterious circumstances, reflecting the volatility of military leadership under Xi’s administration. The broader implications of these purges raise concerns about the stability and efficacy of the PLA as it attempts to navigate its objectives.
Despite the ongoing purges, it appears that the PLAN maintains sufficient talent to absorb these shocks without severely compromising military effectiveness. Corruption may induce operational inefficiencies but does not fundamentally impede the ongoing modernization and expansion of the PLA under Xi’s guidance. The military continues to invest in capabilities essential for potential conflicts, particularly regarding Taiwan.
The strategic focus remains on meeting the Centennial Military Building Goal by 2027, which envisions a more capable and modern military force. These developments underscore a complex reality: while the PLA grapples with internal corruption and leadership instability, it also undertakes one of the most significant military buildups since World War II.
For analysts and policymakers, understanding the nuances of China’s military leadership and the effects of corruption—and how these factors interplay with operational capabilities—is crucial. The ongoing changes in military personnel, while concerning, do not sufficiently undermine the PLA’s advancements. Instead, they illustrate Xi’s determination to consolidate control and ensure the military is primed for crucial future challenges.
